Paul Feyerabend, Against
Method,
The results
obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of
discovery and a context of justification, norms and facts, observational terms
and theoretical terms. None of these distinctions plays a role in scientific
practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences. Popper’s
‘critical’ rationalism fails for the same reasons. (p. 147)
Even
the most surprising stories about the manner in which scientists arrive at
their theories cannot exclude the possibility that they proceed in an entirely
different way once they have found them. But
this possibility is never realized. Inventing theories and contemplating
them in a relaxed and `artistic' .fashion, scientists often make moves that are
forbidden by methodological rules. For example, they interpret the evidence so
that it fits their fanciful ideas, eliminate difficulties by ad hoc procedures, push them aside, or
simply refuse to take them seriously. The activities which according to Feigl
belong to the context of discovery are, therefore, not just different from what philosophers say
about justification, they are in conflict
with it. Scientific practice does not contain two contexts moving side by side, is a complicated mixture of procedures and we are faced
by the question if this mixture should be left as it is, or if it should be
replaced by a more `orderly' arrangement. This is part one of the argument. Now
we have seen that science as we know it today could not exist without a
frequent overruling of the context of justification. This is part two of the
argument. The conclusion is clear. Part one shows that we do not have a
difference, but a mixture. Part two shows that replacing the mixture by an
order that contains discovery on one side and justification on the other would
have ruined science: we are dealing with a uniform practice all of whose
ingredients are equally important for the growth of science. This disposes of
the distinction.
A similar argument applies to the
ritual distinction between methodological prescriptions
and historical descriptions.
Methodology, it is said, deals with what should
be done and cannot be criticized by reference to what is. But we must of course
make sure that our prescriptions have a
point of attack in the historical material, and we must also make sure that
their determined application leads to desirable results. We make sure by
considering (historical, sociological, physical, psychological, etc.) tendencies and laws which tell us what
is possible and what is not possible under the given circumstances and thus
separate feasible prescriptions from those which are going to lead into dead
ends. Again, progress can be made only if the distinction between the ought and the is is regarded as a temporary device rather than as a fundamental
boundary line.
A
distinction which once may have had a point but which has now definitely lost
it is the distinction between observational
terms and theoretical terns. It is
now generally admitted that this distinction is not as sharp as it was thought
to be only a few decades ago. It is also admitted, in complete agreement with
Neurath's original views, that both
theories and observations can be
abandoned: theories may be removed because of conflicting observations, observations
may be removed for theoretical reasons. Finally, we have discovered that learning does not go from observation to
theory but always involves both
elements. Experience arises together
with theoretical assumption not before them, and an experience without theory
is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience:
eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a
person who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest
action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory world (his `observation
language') will start disintegrating, colours and other simple sensations will
disappear until he is in a stage even more primitive than a small child. A
small child, on the other hand, does not possess a stable perceptual world
which he uses for making sense of the theories put before him. Quite the
contrary – he passes through various perceptual stages which are only loosely
connected with each other (earlier stages disappear
when new stages take over – see Chapter 16) and which embody all the
theoretical knowledge available at the time. Moreover, the whole process starts
only because the child reacts correctly towards signals, interprets them correctly, because he possesses means of interpretation
even before he has experienced his first clear sensation.
All
these discoveries cry out for a new terminology that no longer separates what
is so intimately connected in the development both of the individual and of
science at large. Yet the distinction between observation and theory is still
upheld. But what is its point? Nobody will deny that the sentences of science
can be classified into long sentences and short sentences, or that its
statements can be classified into those which are intuitively obvious and
others which are not. Nobody will deny that such distinctions can be made. But nobody will put great
weight on them, or will even mention them, for
they do not now play any decisive role in the business of science. (This
was not always so. Intuitive plausibility, for example, was once thought to be
a most important guide to the truth; it disappeared from methodology the very
moment intuition was replaced by experience, and by formal considerations.)
Does experience play such a role? It does not, as we have seen. Yet the
inference that the distinction between theory and observation has now ceased to
be relevant, is either not drawn or is explicitly rejected.4) 'Let
us take a step forward and let us abandon this last trace of dogmatism in
science!
4). ‘Neurath
fails to give …rules [which distinguish empirical statements from others] and
thus unwittingly throws empiricism overboard’, K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York
and London, 1959, p. 97.
(pp.
148 – 150)
Against
Method, Verso, 1993.
ISBN 0-86091-646-4 (Part 15, pp. 147, 148 – 150)